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Previous research investigating base rate neglect as a bias in human information
processing has focused on isolated individuals. This study complements this research
by showing that in settings of interacting individuals, especially in settings of social
learning, where individuals can learn from one another, base rate neglect can increase
a population’s welfare. This study further supports the research arguing that a popu-
lation with members biased by neglecting base rates does not need to perform worse
than a population with unbiased members. Adapting the model of social learning sug-
gested by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (The Journal of Political Economy 100
(1992) 992–1026) and including base rates that diﬀer from generic cases such as 50–50,
conditions are identiﬁed that make underweighting base rate information increasing the
population’s welfare. The base rate neglect can start a social learning process that other-
wise had not been started and thus base rate neglect can generate positive externalities
improving a population’s welfare.
Keywords: Cognitive biases; base rate neglect; social learning; information cascades;
ecological rationality.
1. Introduction
Individuals placed in uncertain environments experience a large set of cognitive
biases [1]. Often individuals have some prior information about the uncertain envi-
ronment, and during their interaction with the environment they receive additional
cues, and update their beliefs about the environment. This updating process has
frequently been modeled as Bayesian updating, which combines base rate informa-
tion with additional signals to form a new updated judgment [2]. In such scenarios
individuals can experience a cognitive bias that is called base rate neglect or base
rate fallacy. This cognitive bias causes people to signiﬁcantly underweigh the infor-
mation coming across as base rate [3]. If people do not consider the base rate as
having a causal nature or as being speciﬁc and strongly related to the speciﬁc event
under consideration, then the tendency to ignore it becomes stronger [3]. Also rep-
etition of the same task and the incentive structure seem to be moderating factors
[4]. Wherever the eﬀect comes from, a base rate neglect causes individuals to deviate
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from the individually rational behavior that maximizes the unbiased individually
expected payoﬀ. Everything else kept equal, individuals suﬀering from this bias are
worse oﬀ in terms of objectively expected payoﬀs.
Once individuals have been found to suﬀer from cognitive biases, researchers
usually try to reduce the bias, i.e., to debias them [5]. While researchers might do
this for testing the robustness of the bias, there is also research deriving normative
conclusions. Some researchers argue that public administration and policy mak-
ers should, for instance, discourage unrealistically optimistic entrepreneurs from
becoming entrepreneurs [6]. This type of argument refers to normative recommen-
dations based on behavioral ﬁndings, which is subject to various problems, and are
discussed in depth by Berg [7]. More speciﬁcally, for dealing with biases of individ-
uals, it is important to understand whether such individual biases translate into a
loss of welfare for the population the individual is embedded in. Individual ratio-
nality in terms of individual maximization of proﬁts (or utility) does not need to
translate into a maximization of the aggregate proﬁts (or welfare) at a population
level. Especially if externalities are present and individual decisions positively or
negatively aﬀect other people’s outcomes, individual maximization can fail in max-
imizing a population’s overall welfare [8]. As a consequence, detecting individually
irrational behavior does not imply that a population is not maximizing its welfare
at an overall level. Thus, rational maximization of welfare and individual rationality
can diverge. For instance, Bernardo and Welch [9]a n dB e r ga n dL i e n[ 10] show that
overconﬁdence, which is a systematic deviation in subjective beliefs from rational
expectations, can increase a population’s welfare by providing a social beneﬁt that
more than oﬀsets individual costs of that deviation. For base rate neglect, there are
analyses showing that depending on the environment, the bias does not hurt that
much [11]. This ﬁt of cognitive reasoning processes with speciﬁc environments is
called ecological rationality [12, 13].
This article complements the work on the ecological rationality of base rate
neglect by looking at scenarios of social learning, where individuals not only deal
with (public) base rate information and additional (private) signals but also observe
others’ decisions. These observations generate interdependencies between members
of a group or a population. Being part of a population, where one can — at least
partially — observe others is a type of environment that can reasonably be consid-
ered relevant in human decision-making (see [2] for an overview). Such settings of
interacting individuals frequently raise the questions for understanding the depen-
dencies between individuals’ behavior and the overall population’s performance.
The analysis presented in this paper builds on the model of social learning as intro-
duced by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [14]. In this model the beneﬁcial
eﬀects of another cognitive bias has already been investigated. Bernardo and Welch
[9] show that overconﬁdence of all but also of some individuals can sometimes be
beneﬁcial for the whole population. Following an analysis in a diﬀerent but related
model, Kariv [15] concludes that it is not clear in what types of environments over-
conﬁdence is beneﬁcial. In both models, however, the potentially positive eﬀect ofOctober 8, 2010 9:16 WSPC/S0219-5259 169-ACS S0219525910002761
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overconﬁdence for the population is based on an information externality that is
caused by biased individuals. This externality prolongates a social learning process
that otherwise had stopped. Bernardo and Welch [9]a n dK a r i v[ 15] only consider
the case of 50–50 base rates. Their analyses are complemented here by considering
diﬀerent base rates as well as a diﬀerent cognitive bias, speciﬁcally the base rate
neglect.
The next section introduces the basic model. The third section will then show
the welfare eﬀects of social learning for diﬀerent base rates and unbiased individuals.
The fourth section introduces a weight for base rate information into the model and
gives a ﬁrst impression of the beneﬁcial eﬀects of individuals underweighting the
base rate. In the ﬁfth section the optimal weight is determined, while the sixth
section concludes the paper with a brief discussion.
2. The Basic Social Learning Model (BHW Model)
Following Ref. 14, the basic model is built around individuals who are confronted
with a discrete choice between a safe and a risky option. The risky option’s payoﬀ
depends on the some hidden state of the environment, V ∈{ H,L}, which causes
either high payoﬀs (V = H)o rl o wp a y o ﬀ s( V = L). Individuals have some ap r i o r i
information about the probabilities of the environment’s state, i.e., pv = P[V = H]
with 0 ≤ pv ≤ 1, but each receive independently an additional imperfect private
signal Xi ∈{ H,L}, which either signals a high payoﬀ, Xi = H,o ral o wp a y o ﬀ ,
Xi = L, respectively. The signal is symmetric and it is correct only with probability
px = P[X = H|V = H]=P[X = L|V = L]w i t h1>p x > 0.5.a Individuals decide
in an exogenously given sequence. Individual i with i>1 can observe previous
decisions of i − 1 individuals about adopting (a) or rejecting (r) the risky option
and choosing the safe option. These observations are summarized in the history
hi ∈{ a,r}i−1. The history is thus a sequence of letters “a”a n d“ r”. The safe
option’s payoﬀ is given by S with L<S<H.
Assuming no perceptual distortions, perfect information about the decision
rules, information aggregation by Bayesian updating, and maximization of expected
individual payoﬀs, the rational decision for the choice between the safe and risky
option is given by condition (1), written in terms of log-odd ratios. Since the algebra
behind this result is standard, the reader is referred to Ref. 2 f o ram o r ed e t a i l e d
introduction to Bayesian reasoning in models of social learning. In contrast to
other adaptations of the BHW model, e.g., [14, 16, 17], the model developed in this
aFor px = 1, the private information is perfect and there would not be any uncertainty anymore.
For px < 0.5, the signal would systematically signal the wrong thing and it would be better
interpreted inversely, which leads to a signal with px > 0.5. For px =0 .5, the private signal
would not be informative at all, such that the individual decision could not reveal any private
information, which is the basic mechanisms social learning is concerned with, i.e., the diﬀusion of
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For the case of indiﬀerence between the risky and safe option, a random choice
between safe and risky option is assumed [14]. Figure 1, which is discussed later
on, visualizes the eﬀects of an alternative indiﬀerence rule (individuals following
the private signal). As will be shown below, the random choice leads to a more
convincing model.
The base rate information is included as in previous models but is not ﬁxed at
a value where it would disappear, i.e., 0.5. For simpliﬁcation and consistent with
Refs. 14 and 9 we assume that H − S = S − L, which makes the payoﬀ structure
disappearing from (1), i.e., s = 0. The assumption implies that the potential gain
of the risky option relative to the safe option is as large as the potential loss relative
to the safe option.
The private information qx is given by (2); it is equivalent to the analysis in
[14]. The private information qx has only two possible instantiations and these two
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x represent the values for cases X = H and X = L,
respectively. Due to assuming a symmetric signal the absolute values of q+
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are the same, i.e., |q+
x | = |q−












−1i f X = L
+1 if X = H
. (2)
The history information, qh is calculated based on the sequential decision model
and it follows the analysis by Bikhchandani et al. [14]. Note that the model assumes
almost perfect information such that only the private information is hidden. There-
fore, the only information that individuals might learn from observing others’ deci-
sions, is about others’ private information. This information is, however, not always
revealed. From the analysis in Ref. 14 it is obvious that private information is only
revealed if it aﬀects the decision and thus if the remaining parts of condition (1)
are small enough such that the decision changes depending on the value of the pri-
vate information. Since everything in condition (1) except the private information
is public knowledge, individuals observing other individuals can identify whether
or not the others will consider the private information. Therefore, individuals can
identify whether or not the observed decision reveals something about the private
information.October 8, 2010 9:16 WSPC/S0219-5259 169-ACS S0219525910002761
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In fact, others’ decisions can be classiﬁed into three classes: cascades, full rev-
elation, and incomplete revelation. If the private information does not aﬀect the
decision, i.e., the decision does not diﬀer for the cases of a signal indicating a high
payoﬀ and of a signal indicating a low payoﬀ, then the observation does not reveal
any information and it can be ignored.
If the decision completely depends on the private information, i.e., it adopts
if the private signal indicates a high payoﬀ and reject otherwise, then the private
information is fully revealed.
Individuals can get into a state of indiﬀerence, which happens if the private
information is as large as the remaining parts of the adoption condition, i.e., |qh +




. In such cases the private information might only be incompletely
revealed. For instance, if qh+qA equals the value of qx for a negative private signal,
then receiving a negative signal makes the individual reject the risky option as
it further strengthens the negative evaluation. However, for a positive signal the
individual becomes indiﬀerent and chooses randomly such that adoption occurs
with a probability of 50%. Note that observing the adoption in this case perfectly
reveals the private information, while observing a rejection incompletely reveals
information. The rejection could be caused by a negative signal or by chance for
a positive signal. Let df be the diﬀerence between adoptions and rejections with
full revelation. The information revealed by observations with full revelation can




. Further, let dl be the diﬀerence between adoptions and
rejections with incomplete revelation. The information revealed by observations




. The complete term for
the history information is then given by (3).











For a detailed analysis of the basic model without reference to welfare aspects, the
reader might consider Ref. 14.
3. Limits to Social Learning
A central feature of the BHW model is that social learning is restricted; the more
extreme the information derived from observing other’s decisions, the higher is
the tendency that the private information does not matter and individuals just
follow these observations. Depending on whether they adopt or reject regardless
of their private signal, individuals are considered to be in an adoption cascade or
in a rejection cascade, respectively. In the more general model developed here, an








and a rejection cascade













|qA + qh|. Under this condition, decisions are not aﬀected by the private signal,
because either the history information qh or the base rate information qA or both
together are as extreme as the private information does not counter it. The proofsOctober 8, 2010 9:16 WSPC/S0219-5259 169-ACS S0219525910002761
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in Ref. 14 show that the probability of reaching a cascade approaches 1.0 for an
inﬁnite number of individuals, this can be generalized to our model for those cases
where social learning occurs.
In previous models such as Refs. 14 and 9, base rates are assumed to be 50–50.
In these cases, the adoption condition only contains the term for history informa-
tion besides private information. Therefore, the only reason for individuals to end
up in a cascade in these models is information derived from observing other indi-
viduals’ decisions. The model developed here allows non-trivial base rates. Thus,
the base rate might be as extreme such that already the ﬁrst individual’s decision
(for the ﬁrst individual qh is zero) is not aﬀected by the private information, i.e.,
for all possible instances of qx the individual decides the same way. In this case, no
social learning occurs and all decide as if they had no private information. There are
therefore two types of information cascades, those caused by information derived
from observing others and those cascades triggered by extreme base rates. To dis-
tinguish one case from the other, we will refer to the former type as endogenous
cascade, because the observations are endogenously created in the model, and to
the latter as exogenous cascade, because the base rate is not aﬀected by individuals’
decisions.
Most parts of the analysis of the single decision can either be found directly
in Ref. 14 or the arguments can easily be extended to the model developed here.
Instead of analyzing the individual decision, this study focuses on welfare implica-
tions. More precisely, it asks the question of how do changes in the decision rule
aﬀect the social welfare.
In order to analyze welfare eﬀects, we have to deﬁne welfare for a population
of cognitively biased individuals. This study follows [9, 10] and deﬁnes welfare as
the sum of objectively, i.e., unbiased, expected payoﬀs over all individuals in a
population. Note that the expected payoﬀ used for calculating the actual welfare is
based on true probabilities and not on distorted perceptions. Further, due to the
exogenous random sequencing of individuals, one can use the objectively expected
payoﬀ of an individual as proxy for the welfare of a population.b By referring to
the unbiased expected payoﬀ, it is assumed that the base rate neglect does not
aﬀect the utility of individuals but only the quality of their decisions. The base
rate neglect is therefore considered as a mistake that people would actually avoid
if they were capable of doing it, it is a perceptual bias only. If instead one assumes
biases that change utilities such as risk attitudes, then comparing the welfare of
two populations that diﬀer in the bias of their members gets diﬃcult to analyze.
The problem is close to the analysis of welfare consequences of preference changes
(see Ref. 18). However, the assumption that a perceptual bias does not change the
utility function simpliﬁes the analysis.
bSimilar to Ref. 9 we iteratively calculate the probabilities of speciﬁc histories and signals as well
as expected payoﬀs associated with adoption and rejection in these situations. These numerical
calculations are implemented in Java.October 8, 2010 9:16 WSPC/S0219-5259 169-ACS S0219525910002761
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Figure 1 plots the expected payoﬀs for an individual against diﬀerent base rates
and as already mentioned for two diﬀerent rules for decisions under indiﬀerence.
This visualization as well as all the following are based on a population size of
n = 50.c Since the interesting eﬀects are a bit diﬃcult to see in Fig. 1,F i g .2 plots
the same expected payoﬀs but relative to the case of a population with private
information but without social learning, i.e., individuals cannot observe each other.
Without any private signals, individuals can only base their decisions on the base
rate. Below pv =0 .5, they go for the safe option receiving a payoﬀ independent of
the base rate, while above pv =0 .5, they choose the risky option which gives a payoﬀ
























Fig. 1. Expected payoﬀs for no information (•), for private information only ( ), for perfect
private information ( ), for private information and social learning with random choice when
indiﬀerent ( ), for private information and social learning with following private information




























































Fig. 2. Expected payoﬀs relative to expected payoﬀs for private information only ( ), for perfect
private information ( ), for private information and social learning with random choice when
indiﬀerent ( ), for private information and social learning with following private information
when indiﬀerent ( ). Private signal quality px equals 0.7.
cMost results derived for the BHW model and its derivatives do not change substantially for larger
populations.October 8, 2010 9:16 WSPC/S0219-5259 169-ACS S0219525910002761
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where px =0 .7 is assumed), but cannot observe others, then they base their decision
only on the private signal and the base rate. Their decision is based on the private
signal if the base rate is not too extreme such that the signal can counter-balance
the base rate. Here the individuals’ expected payoﬀs conditional on the base rate
increase due to better information. Only in these scenarios, where private signals
may inﬂuence decisions, decisions can reveal information to following individuals. In
these settings, we also see an additional beneﬁt due to observing others’ decisions.
Figures 1 and 2 also demonstrate an alternative indiﬀerence rule, “follow the own
signal,” which has been employed in Refs. 19 and 16. Bernardo and Welch [9] allow
indiﬀerent individuals to abstain from a decision between risky and safe option,
and thus give indiﬀerent individuals the opportunity to perfectly reveal their private
information. Due to the perfect information revelation for indiﬀerence cases and the
same expected payoﬀ for the individual, their speciﬁc indiﬀerence rule is equivalent
to the rule “follow the own signal.” Figures 1 and 2 show that this rule has some
discontinuities, which implies that increasing the base rate from 0.5o n l yb ya
very small amount reduces the expected payoﬀ very much. The indiﬀerence rule
“random choice” seems to generate more plausible dynamics. Nevertheless, also for
the latter indiﬀerence rule there is a point where an increasing base rate decreases
expected payoﬀs. However, this point describes a reasonable eﬀect, i.e., reaching a
limit beyond which social learning does not occur; it is thus not only an artifact.
Figure 3 visualizes the welfare of populations across diﬀerent base rates for
three levels of the private signal quality px. The better the private signal the wider
the range where the private information matters and, thus, where social learning




≥| qA|. As discussed above with respect to Figs. 1 and 2,
the range of base rates that do not prevent social learning is bounded from the
left side by a jump from expected payoﬀ of 0.5 to a value above 0.5 and bounded
from the right side by a non-monotonic behavior, where the expected payoﬀ drops
























Fig. 3. Expected payoﬀ versus base rates (safe payoﬀs) for diﬀerent qualities of the private signal:
px =0 .7(  ), px =0 .8(  ), px =0 .9(  ).October 8, 2010 9:16 WSPC/S0219-5259 169-ACS S0219525910002761
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the expected proﬁt just by a very small amount, but social learning stops, which
decreases expected proﬁts by a substantially larger amount. Social learning stops
because the ﬁrst individual already follows the base rate information and does not
reveal the private information.
Before getting into the analysis of base rate neglect, let us brieﬂy consider two
observations for the BHW model which becomes relevant later on.
The ﬁrst observation refers to endogenous cascades, i.e., those that are triggered
by observations of others’ decisions. Note that whenever the history information is
more informative than the private information, individuals do not care about the
private information and thus do not reveal this private information. This implies
that whenever the history information is stronger than a single private signal, social
learning stops. Therefore the beneﬁt of social learning in this model is limited to
the provision of information equivalent to a single private signal.
The second observation refers to the inﬂuence of base rate information. For





> |qA|), changes in the base rate that keep the base rate in this range
do not aﬀect the decisions. In other words, besides aﬀecting the expected payoﬀ,
the base rate is irrelevant with respect to decisions that are taken.d
4. Base Rate Neglect: Expanding the Limits of Social Learning
After developing and solving the model for unbiased decision makers, we can
now consider the base rate neglect as a deviation from unbiased decision-making.
Following Ref. 4, the base rate neglect is operationalized as a linear underweighting
of the base rate information qA. The adoption condition can be re-written as in (4)
with β = 1 representing the unbiased reasoning process, 0 <β<1r e p r e s e n t i n ga n
underweighting, and β = 0 representing a complete base rate neglect.
0 <q h + qx + βqA with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1( 4 )
As shown above, extreme base rates can prevent social learning. If a base rate
neglect weakens the impact of base rates, then one might expect social learning
processes occurring for a bigger set of scenarios, i.e., for more extreme base rates.
Since the previous analysis has shown that social learning processes can be good
for a population, we might expect an increased expected payoﬀ for scenarios where
social learning does not take place without introducing the base rate neglect. Fur-
ther, since the basic model is robust to some changes in the base rate if people
follow the private information, we may also do not expect a loss in expected payoﬀs
for scenarios where social learning took already place in the original model.
dIf the observations are made noisy, such that observations have less impact, then base rate changes
may have an eﬀect. However, we stick to the simple model, since the noise does not change the
basic results, but if including the noise, one had to separate the eﬀects of noise from the eﬀects
of base rate neglect, which blew up the analysis without gaining more insights into the basic































































Fig. 4. Expected payoﬀs relative to expected payoﬀs for private information only ( ), social
learning with β =1 .0(  ), with β =0 .75 ( ), with β =0 .25 (♦). Graph on the right-hand
side plots the expected payoﬀ relative to the case of private information only. Quality of private
information px equals 0.7.
The intuition regarding the potentially beneﬁcial eﬀects of base rate neglect is
supported by Fig. 4, which plots expected payoﬀs for diﬀerent β and for diﬀerent
base rates. One observes that an increasing base rate neglect, i.e., a decreasing β,
extends the range of base rates where a social learning process is started. Without
any base rate neglect (β =1 .0), the social learning process is restricted to the range
[1 − px,p x]. With a base rate weight of β =0 .8, the range expands while keeping
the expected payoﬀ for all base rates above the levels reached in a setting without
a base rate neglect. The loss in expected payoﬀs of the individuals that starts the
process is counter-balanced by the risk reduction for following individuals due to
the information externality. However, if the bias is too big (i.e., β =0 .3), then
individuals may perform worse for more extreme base rates. The range of social
learning is expanded too much. Altogether, there seems to be an optimal level of
base rate neglect.
Running analyses equivalent to Fig. 4 but for many values of β between zero
and one (and assuming a signal quality of px =0 .7) ﬁnds that for β =0 .5t h e
population maximizes its expected payoﬀ over all possible base rates. This means
that the range of social learning is expanded to the interval between 15.5% and
84.5% but not into the area where it would lead to a loss in expected payoﬀs. These
values reﬂect the points where the zero line is crossed. Note that the range where
social learning occurs is between 30% and 70% if there is no base rate neglect and in
this range the base rate neglect does not change the expected payoﬀ too. However,
in scenarios where social learning starts but has not been started without base rate
neglect, the whole population is better oﬀ.
The intuition behind this result is the idea that the base rate neglect should
not suppress more information than is generated through social learning trig-
gered by the base rate neglect. Recalling that social learning provides at most
as much information as a single private signal (see discussion above), it should notOctober 8, 2010 9:16 WSPC/S0219-5259 169-ACS S0219525910002761
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suppress more information than a single private signal. This is in fact the case for









, then an underweighting of this base rate does not change
the decision (see discussion above). If the base rate is more extreme than two pri-








, then unbiased decision makers would
not care about the private signal. However, an underweighting of the base rate by
0.5 still leaves a base rate which is larger than a single private signal and lets a
decision maker to still ignore the private signal. The base rate neglect only changes
behavior for settings where the base rate is in between and thus for settings where
the base rate carries information of a strength between a single private signal and
two private signals. In this range, an individual that would rationally not care about
the private information is made caring about it by underweighting the base rate.
There is a caveat to the reasoning, which is the size of the population. In this
model, assuming a single individual, base rate neglect is welfare decreasing because
nobody can proﬁt from the information externality generated through the base
rate neglect. In other models, however, such as such as Berg and Hoﬀrage [20],
ignoring relevant information can be absolutely cost-free to the individual in terms
of expected payoﬀs. The negative eﬀect in the model presented in this paper exists
for all ﬁrst individuals independent of the size of a population. This ﬁrst individual
will generate an externality but does not beneﬁt from it. However, the larger the
population becomes, the more individuals can beneﬁt and the less the impact of
the ﬁrst individual. For a suﬃciently small population, a base rate neglect becomes
suboptimal. These arguments together with the ﬁnding in this paper for larger
populations guarantee the existence of such a threshold.
5. Conclusion
The paper demonstrates that a base rate neglect can be beneﬁcial for a population.
The primary positive eﬀect of base rate neglect is that it can trigger social learning
in settings where such processes would usually not start. This study shows that for
the model developed by Ref. 14 where one relaxes the assumption of a 50–50 base
rate the expected payoﬀs of a population is maximized with a base rate neglect
that underweighs the base rate by a factor of one half.
Together with the work by Bernardo and Welch [9], Berg and Lien [10], and
Berg and Hoﬀrage [20], this study illustrates the fact that a cognitive bias does
not maximize the objectively expected payoﬀs of an individual (keeping everything
else equal) but does not generalize to the fact that this bias destroys the welfare
of a population. The interaction between members of a population can even lead
to the observation that a cognitive bias enhances the population’s welfare. This is
exactly what this study shows for the base rate neglect and what Bernardo and
Welch [9, 10] show for overconﬁdence. Policymakers should therefore be careful
when judging the value of debiasing based on the analysis of a single individual. It
is not unlikely that the link between social welfare maximization and maximizationOctober 8, 2010 9:16 WSPC/S0219-5259 169-ACS S0219525910002761
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of individually expected payoﬀs is not straightforward. While this study focuses on
the base rate neglect, Berg and Gigerenzer [21] discuss the issue at a more general
level.
While this study discourages policymakers from funding projects that debias
people with respect to base rate neglect, there is still the opportunity that free mar-
kets debias people. If for instance, biased individuals recognize that their expected
payoﬀs are below the expected payoﬀ of unbiased individuals, they might have an
incentive to hire consultants or trainers who help them avoid these biases. While
this might increase the payoﬀs in the short run, the population-wide employment
of debiasing will decrease the overall payoﬀs. Therefore, policymakers might even
have an incentive to restrict the free market forces to avoid the spread of debiasing
practices.
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